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A COUESE OF INSTRUCTION 



IN 



THE ELEMENTS 



OP THE 



ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 






FOR THE USE OF THE 

CADETS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY. 






' y by 



J* B. WHEELER, 
n 

PROFESSOR OF MILITARY ENGINEERING IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY. 
AND BREVET COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY. 




NEW YORK: 
D. VAN NOSTEAND, PUBLISHES, 

23 MURRAY STREET & 27 WARREN STREET. 

1878. 



(7> 



O 1 



Copyright by D. Van Nosteamd, 1878. 



" Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the 
tax-gatherer, or the greedy gambler in stocks, stands in public estimation 
above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or 
fortune to the defence of his country ?'— [Jomini.] 



ART AND SCIENCE OF WAE. 



CHAPTER I. 



DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR. 

1. Nations often become involved with other nations or 
states in quarrels or disputes which can not be settled or 
composed by peaceful measures. Military force is then em- 
ployed and the resulting contest is known as "war." 

2. War has therefore been defined to be "a contest be- 
tween nations, states, or parts of states, carried on by force." 

Wars are classified in various ways. They are classified 
from the nature of the military operations employed in their 
prosecution ; into offensive or defensive wars : from the end 
to be attained ; into wars of conquest, wars of independence, 
etc. : from the causes producing the war ; into wars of in- 
surrection, religious wars, etc. : from the general locality in 
which they are waged ; into American, African, European, 
etc. Other classifications than these are also used, being 
based on the nature and object of the war. 

The subdivisions and classifications employed are gener- 
ally of so marked a character that the reader will easily per- 
ceive the reasons governing their use by the writer. 



45 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

3. The classification into defensive and offensive wars is 
the only one that will be used in this treatise, since its object 
is to discuss only the general principles and rules applicable 
to all wars after they have begun, without regard to the 
■causes which produced them or the end for which they may 
•be waged. 

Any military movement, having for its object an attack 
upon the enemy, is termed an offensive operation. 

Any military movement, having for its object the await- 
ing of an attack by the enemy, is termed a defensive opera- 
tion. 

A war in which the military operations are offensive is 
therefore termed an offensive war; if the operations are 
defensive, it is a defensive war. 

Hence, a war carried on in an enemy's country is gener- 
ally an offensive war ; and a war carried on in one's own 
country to resist the attacks of a foreign enemy or to repel 
an invasion, is a defensive one. A war may, however, in a 
military sense be essentially offensive, while at the same time 
in a political sense it is defensive. That is, a nation or state 
may, in order to defend its rights, take the "offensive," 
while its opponent, who incited the war and who is the real 
offender, may from policy or interest confine itself to strictly 
defensive operations. 

4. Whether the war be an offensive or a defensive one, 
the art of properly employing and of rightly directing the 
movements of armies, so as to bring the war to a successful 
termination, becomes one of the greatest importance. It is- 
this art, and the principles on which it is founded, that are 
now to be considered. 



DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR. 7 

5. War is both a science and an art. All investigations 
which have for their object the determination of the great 
principles which should govern a general in conducting his 
military operations ; all analyses which are made to show the 
important and essential features which characterize a cam- 
paign or a battle, and comparisons made with other cam- 
paigns and battles ; all deductions and formations of rules 
which are to be used in military operations ; all these belong- 
to the " Science of War." 

The practical application of these great principles and 
rules belongs to the "Art of War." 

6. In the science of war as well as in the other physical 
sciences, the facts must precede theory ; and although the 
number of known facts is steadily increasing, the number of 
general principles upon which the theories of the science are 
based, is constant, if not decreasing. 

These general principles are deduced by a close and 
critical examination of such methods of waging war as have 
been adopted by those great generals who are known as emi- 
nent in their profession. 

7. It is evident then that an intimate connection exists 
between military history and the science of war. 

Napoleon said, "Alexander made eight campaigns ; Han- 
nibal, seventeen, one in Spain, fifteen in Italy, and one in 
Africa; Caesar, thirteen, of which eight were against the 
Gauls and five against the legions of Pompey ; G-ustavus 
Adolphus, three ; Turenne, eighteen ; Prince Eugene of 
Savoy, thirteen ; Frederick, eleven, in Bohemia, Silesia, 
and on the banks of tne Elbe. The history of these eighty- 
four campaigns, written with care, would be a complete 



b ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

treatise on the art of war. From this source, the principles 
which ought to be followed, in offensive as well as defensive 
warfare, could at once be obtained." 

To these campaigns, are to be added the battles and cam- 
paigns of Napoleon. 

Jomini, an eminent writer on military art, says, " Correct 
theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual 
events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will 
form a true school of instruction for generals. If these 
means do not produce great men, they will at least produce 
generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the natural 
masters of the art of war." 

The sources of all treatises on the "Art and Science of 
War " are to be found in the military histories narrating the 
events and results of the battles and campaigns just enu- 
merated. 

General Divisions of the Art of "War. 

8. The Art of War is divided into several distinct parts 
or branches. Jomini gives the following, 

1. Statesmanship in relation to war, 

2. Strategy. 

3. Grand Tactics. 

4. Logistics. 

5. Engineering. 

6. Minor Tactics. 

As the object of this treatise is to allude only to the prin- 
ciples and rules common to all wars, the first subdivision 
may be omitted for the present, and the following classifica- 
tion may be used, viz : 



DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR. 9 

1. Strategy. 

2. Tactics. 

3. Engineering. 

4. Logistics. 

9. These branches of the Science of War may be defined 
as follows : 

Strategy. — The science of directing masses of troops 
with promptitude, precision and clearness, upon those points 
the possession of which is of great importance in military 
operations. 

Tactics. — The art of executing the designs of strategy. 

Engineering. — The art of disposing troops, and making 
arrangements of obstacles, by means of which an inferior 
force may successfully resist the attacks of a superior force ; 
and also the art of overcoming and removing all obstacles 
placed in the way by an opposing force. 

Logistics. — The art of moving and supplying armies. 

10. The best tactical combinations may produce no de- 
cisive results, if the movements of the army previous to a 
battle were not strategical ; a fault in tactics may be the 
cause of the loss of a battle, of a strategical position, or of a 
strategical line. 

Battles have been lost and even entire campaigns have 
failed, in consequence of neglect in the branch of engineer- 
ing, or through some fault committed by the engineer. And 
even when there has been success in these three branches, 
an army may be powerless to seize an advantage with- 
in its grasp, or to follow the enemy after securing a victo- 
rious result, from the want of transportation or from a 
failure in supplies. 

1* 



10 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

These four branches of the Science and Art of War are 
therefore intimately connected, and a knowledge of them is 
essential to the staff-officer, as well as to the general officer 
who directs the movements of the army. 

Jomini says that " familiarity with all these branches is 
not essential in order to be a good infantry, cavalry, or ar- 
tillery officer ; but for a general or staff officer, this knowl- 
edge is indispensable." 



CHAPTER II. 



STRATEGY. 



11. Definitions. — Strategy has been defined to be the 
science of directing, with promptitude, precision and clear- 
ness, masses of troops to gain possession of points of impor- 
tance in military operations. 

The object of strategy is to so direct these masses that 
upon reaching any designated point, the army shall have a 
better position than that held by the enemy, or shall have 
such a position as will force him to change his position, or 
shall be superior to him in numbers, or shall have some de- 
cided advantage over the enemy, in case of a conflict. 

12. If two armies, when brought face to face, have kept 
their lines of communication protected and are both ready 
to concentrate for action, it is evident no strategical object 
has been attained by either of them. 

If, however, one of the armies has been so directed that 
it has gained a position which forces its opponent to retire or 
to fight at a disadvantage, it is evident that one of the 
objects of strategy has been attained. 

13. A movement of an army is therefore said to be 
"strategical," when by its means there are concentrated at 
a given point troops superior in numbers to those of the 
enemy ; or, at this point, there is gained a position by which 
the enemy's communications with his base are cut or threat- 



12 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

ened while those of the army are secure ; or, a position is 
gained by which the forces of the enemy are separated or 
are prevented from acting in concert. 

14. Strategical operations are directed to attain one or 
more of these objects ; and the line followed by an army in 
an operation of this kind, is called a " strategical line" 

The area of country or territory in any part of which the 
hostile forces can come into collision, is termed the "thea- 
tre of war." 

There may be employed in a given theatre of war several 
armies or only one. If there are several armies, but each 
acting independently of the others, or if there is only one, 
the particular portion of the territory in which each acts is 
termed the "theatre of operations " for that army. 

15. A theatre of operations of an army may be denned to 
be all the territory it may desire to invade, and all that it 
may have to defend. Where several armies are employed, 
acting in concert, the theatre of operations of each army 
depends upon the movements of the other armies, and the 
theatres of operations of each army in this case are usually 
designated as "zones of operations;" although this term is 
also applied to those three divisions of a theatre of operations 
lying directly in advance of the centre and flanks of a front of 
operations. 

Whatever is true for a theatre of operations of an army 
acting alone is equally true for the theatres of operations of 
several armies acting separately, and is also applicable to the 
whole theatre of war. 

16. To make our statements definite, suppose a single 
army acting in an independent theatre of operations. 



STRATEGY. 13 

A general with such an army under his command propos- 
ing an advance towards the enemy will have three things to 
consider. 

These are as follows, 

1. The place from which the army is to start. 

2. The point to which the army is to go. 

3. The roads or routes by which the army is to move in 
order to reach this point. 

The first, or place of starting, is termed " the base of 
operations." 

The second, the point to be reached, is called the " ob- 
jective point " or simply " the objective" 

The third, the roads or routes used by the army in 
reaching the objective point, is termed the " line of opera- 
tions" 

The portion of the theatre of operations in front of the 
successive positions occupied by the army as it advances, is 
known as the "front of operations." 

Bases of Operations. 

17. A base of operations is the section or portion of coun- 
try, adjoining the theatre of operations, in which the sup- 
plies and reinforcements for an army may be collected, from 
which an army moves to take the offensive, and upon which 
it falls back if obliged to retreat. As it is difficult and per- 
haps dangerous to collect all the supplies necessary for an 
army at one point, it is usual to select several points so situ- 
ated as to provide in the best manner for a proper distribu- 
tion of the depots of supplies. These points should be safe 
from any sudden attack of the enemy ; they should therefore 



14 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

occupy strong positions, well fortified, and should be con- 
nected by good communications. 

A wide river, not fordable, with both sides fortified, is 
generally regarded as the best kind of base. A base of this 
description forms a strong line of defence in case the army 
has to defend itself, is secure from any sudden attack from 
the enemy, has good communications with the different 
points, and can be easily kept supplied. 

18. The base of operations for an army invading an 
enemy's country is in general that part of the frontier sepa- 
rating the army from the theatre of war. 

The base of operations for an army defending its own 
country is generally the capital and the country surround- 
ing it. 

Where one of the contestants has control of all the navi- 
gable waters separating the two countries, a portion of the 
enemy's own country in which there is a good harbor, which 
may be held and kept supplied, is frequently used as a base 
of operations for the invading army. 

This was the case in the war with Mexico in 1847, when 
Genera] Scott captured Vera Cruz and made use of it and 
the surrounding country as a base of operations in his inva- 
sion of Mexico. 

19. The selection of the locality of the base will depend 
greatly upon the plan of campaign. Assuming that the 
locality is fixed, a good base must fulfil the conditions already 
mentioned, viz : the depots of supplies, magazines, etc., must 
be so located as to be secure from any sudden attack of the 
enemy; these depots must be so situated that they can be 
kept supplied and connected by good communications ; and 



STRATEGY. 15 

the base must form a good line of defence to be used by the 
army if required. 

20. The advantages of a base depend greatly on its extent 
and form. 

A base of considerable extent possesses advantages greater 
than those of a base more contracted. The longer it is, the 
greater will be the number of roads leading from it towards 
the enemy's positions, thus giving a choice of line of opera- 
tions ; and a choice of lines of retreat if obliged to fall back. 

A contracted base, as that of a single harbor, restricts the 
army to a single line of operations, and this line becomes more 
precarious as its length increases. The enemy getting pos- 
session of it will succeed in cutting off all supplies and rein- 
forcements, and will embarrass, if not entirely cripple, the in- 
vading army. 

Hence, an army beginning with a contracted base should 
extend its base as soon as possible, by occupying, as it ad- 
vances, other strong points, and strengthening them by fortifi- 
cations. The depots of supplies should be distributed in the 
best manner, extending them behind the flanks of the army 
as widely as may be consistent with their safety. 

21. The base may have a straight direction ; it may be 
broken, or have an angular shape ; or it may have a curved 
direction. 

22. Straight bases. If the base is straight it may be par- 
allel to the enemy's base, or it may be inclined thereto. 

If the base is straight and parallel to that of the enemy, 
and of the same extent, neither contestant has an advantage 
over the other. If one is of greater extent, that army with 
the greater base will have a choice between a greater number 



16 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

of lines of operations, and will have greater freedom of move- 
ment. If the base is oblique to the enemy's front, and is of 
sufficient extent, it may be possible to turn some of the posi- 
tions occupied by the enemy and force him to retire, abandon- 
ing the ground in his advance. 

This may be seen by an examination of Figure (1). 

Fig.1 




If an army, as M, has for its base the line CD, parallel to 
the enemy's front E, and of extent equal to that of his base, 
AB, any movement made to get on the flank or rear of E 
would result in exposing M's own line of communications 
with its base, CD, and no particular advantage would be 
gained. If the base was oblique as shown by the line CF, 
then an army, as M, could place itself with safety in a posi- 
tion, as N, threatening the left flank of the army, E, and its 
communications with its base, AB. 



STRATEGY. 17 

23. Angular base. If the base is angular, the angle may 
be towards the enemy or away from him. If it is salient, 
(Fig. 2), it is plain an enemy, EE, moving beyond the salient 



Fig.2 




A, would have his communications threatened from A, and 
would also be liable to a flank attack. 

A base of this form is weak at the salient. The smaller 
the angle at A, or the farther this front is advanced beyond 
B and C, the weaker will the base be. The salient must 
therefore be strengthened, and made perfectly safe. 

A base of this form is, however, more favorable for an 
army acting on the defensive than for one acting offensively. 
For an army acting within the angle, BAC, can move from 
one part of the line to another, to reinforce any part of the 
line, more quickly than one on the exterior can. 

24. If the base instead of being salient is drawn back be- 
hind B and 0, that is forms a re-entrant, it will be more favor- 
able for an army acting offensively than for an enemy acting 
defensively. For an army proceeding from a base, of this 
form, can threaten or seize the communications of its opponent 
without exposing its own. 

A favorable example of this kind of base is seen in Fig. (3). 



18 



AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 



Let ABDF represent the field of operations ; and suppose 
the side AF to be closed by insurmountable obstacles, and the 
sides AB and BC to be under the control of the army M, which, 
has advanced from the side AB. It is seen that the army At 
can occupy safely a new position as N, threatening the enemy's 

Fig.3 



Hank and rear, and in case of defeat has a safe line of retreat 
toO. 

Bases of this form are generally termed " double bases" 
and have the advantage of giving two lines of retreat widely 
apart, either of which may be used. 

25. Curved bases. Bases may be curved in form, either 
convex or concave towards the enemy. Curved bases are 
simply modified forms of angular bases, and possess the 
advantages of the latter in proportion to the degree of con- 
vexity and concavity they may have. 

26. Selection of base. The direction or the general 
form of the base, exercises therefore a considerable influence 



STRATEGY. 1& 

upon military operations, and this must be duly considered in 
making a plan of campaign. 

The choice of form of base will, as it is seen, be influ- 
enced by the kind, offensive or defensive, of the war to be 
undertaken. 

So, also, with the extent of base. Some proportion must 
exist between the length of base and the length of the line of 
operations. 

In the case of a straight line as a base, military writers 
have assumed that these lines will be correctly proportioned 
to each other when the straight lines, drawn from the ob- 
jective point to the extremities of the base, form with the 
base itself an equilateral triangle. 

The advantages of an extended base have been mentioned- 
In case of a retreat, the base is to form a line of defence ; as 
a long line of defence is necessarily weak, there must be a 
limit to the extent of the base. 

27. The bases thus far considered have been those estab- 
lished in the beginning of a campaign and from which the 
first advances are made. These bases are known as "pri- 
mary bases." 

28. Secondary bases. An army carries with it ammu- 
nition only sufficient for one battle, and but a few days' supply 
of food. These supplies of ammunition and provisions must 
be brought from the base ; and as the army advances, the 
difficulty of keeping up the supplies increases. An army is 
then said to be " tied to its base " unless some additional 
provision be made. 

As the necessary supplies can not be obtained in the 
theatre of operations in sufficient quantities for the daily 



20 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

needs of an army, depots and magazines must be organized 
near the army from which these supplies can be procured. 

The same precautions which were recommended, for 
establishing a primary base, should be observed in establish- 
ing these second points, which together form what is known 
as a "secondary base." 

Napoleon said, "It is necessary for an army marching to 
the conquest of a country to have, at every five or six days' 
march, a fortification or an intrenched position upon the line 
of operations, in order to collect there supplies of provisions 
and ammunition, to organize its trains, and to make it a 
centre of operations," etc. 

29. Although prudent to establish successive bases of 
operations fulfilling „ all the conditions given for primary 
bases, it does not follow that an army should stop in the 
middle of a successful advance for such a purpose. It would 
be sufficient to leave detachments of troops to hold important 
points, to strengthen these points by fortifications, and to 
keep open and guard the communications in rear. Under the 
protection of these detachments depots of supplies could be 
established, although they might not have the relative position 
or requirements demanded of such points on a primary base. 

Lines of Operations. 

30. The roads or routes by which an army moves from 
its base towards its objective point have been designated by 
the term "line of operations." 

Lines of operations are classified from their number ; into 
single, double, or multiple lines : from their positions with 
respect to the lines of operations of the enemy ; into interior 
or exterior lines : and from their position with respect to 



STRATEGY. 21 

each other ; into convergent or divergent lines : other classi- 
fications are sometimes used descriptive of the nature or 
other quality of the line. 

31. Single line of operations. An army moving in a 
given direction with all its parts united, or with those parts so 
situated that they can be readily joined when required, is 
said to use a " single line of operations." Sometimes this 
Hue is called a simple line. 

A single line of. operations does not mean a single road, 
but embraces all the roads or routes taken by the fractions of 
the army for the purpose of reaching a common point of 
concentration ; the condition being imposed, that these 
roads shall not be so far apart, or have intervening such 
obstacles, that the different parts of an army will be pre- 
vented from uniting at any given time which may be 
appointed. 

32. Double and multiple lines of operations. When 
there are obstacles intervening between the roads or routes 
passed over by an army, or the roads are so far apart as to 
prevent the parts of the army from being readily united, the 
army is then said to employ "double" or "multiple" lines 
of operations. 

33. Interior lines of operations. If these lines are within 
those employed by the enemy, they are known as " interior " 
lines. 

34. Exterior lines of operations. If these lines are out- 
side of the lines employed by the enemy, they are called 
"exterior" lines. 

35. Convergent lines of operations. If these lines of 
operations start from points some distance apart, approach 



22 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAE. 

each other, and meet at some point in advance, they are called 
"convergent." Sometimes the term "concentric" is em- 
ployed to designate them. 

36. Divergent lines of operations. These lines are the 
reverse of convergent lines, as they continue to separate, or 
the distance between them to widen, as the army advances* 
The term " eccentric " is also applied to them. 

37. Accidental lines of operations. Lines of operations 
are sometimes employed, different from those proposed in the 
original plan of campaign. To these lines the term "acci- 
dental " is applied. It does not follow that their adoption is 
a matter of accident, as might be inferred from their name. 
They are frequently the result of a change in the original plan, 
which probable change was foreseen and provided for. 

38. Temporary lines of operations. Sometimes an army 
in mating a movement employs a line which deviates from 
that adopted in the general plan of campaign. As soon as 
the movement is completed the original lines are resumed. 
Such line adopted for such movement is termed a "tempo- 
rary line." The term "maneuver line" is also applied to it. 

39. Lines of retreat. The roads passed over, as the 
army advances, are ordinarily the roads taken when the army 
retires or is driven back. In the latter case they are known as 
"'lines of retreat" and are " single," " double," " diverging," 
etc., according to their number and position. 

40. Lines of communication. The term "lines of 
communication" is applied to all the practicable routes and 
roads connecting the different parts of an army occupying the 
theatre of war. Therefore, as the army moves from its base, 
the lines of operations become lines of communication, and 



STRATEGY. 23 

since these " lines of operations " are generally the longest 
and most important lines of communication, it is to them 
that the simple term "communications". generally refers. 

All the routes used by the trains employed in provision- 
ing an army, form a part of the communications. The most 
important, safest and most convenient of these routes, all 
other things being equal, will be the central one, or the one 
leading from the centre of the army back to the base. This 
particular route is sometimes designated as the "line of sup- 
plies." 

41. Strategical lines. The lines followed by an army in 
making a strategical movement are called "strategical lines." 

Temporary lines of operations, .or maneuver lines, there- 
fore, are strategical lines. Lines of operations are important 
stragetical lines. And in general, lines connecting two or 
more strategical points, which lines can be used by an army, 
and which allow of easy communication between these points, 
are "strategical lines." A base of operations is therefore a 
strategical line. 

42. Safety of a line of communication. So vast is 
the amount of ammunition consumed in a battle by the mod- 
ern fire-arms, that it is almost impossible, as has been before 
stated, for an army to carry with it more than enough for a 
single battle. 

If, after a general engagement, it is found that the enemy 
has possession of the army's communications with its base, it 
may be simply an impossibility to' continue the contest, or it 
may be necessary to abandon to the enemy a large portion of 
country which it was desirous to retain. Thus Napoleon, 
after the second day's battle at Leipsic, had so reduced his 



24 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

supply of ammunition as to be obliged to withdraw to his de- 
pots at Erfurt, losing his line of communication with Torgau. 

The roads forming the communications of an army are 
more or less filled with trains carrying forward supplies of 
every description, and trains returning filled with sick and 
wounded. Detachments of men and numbers of stragglers 
are scattered along the route, many of them going to the 
rear. All these fall into the hands of the enemy upon his 
getting possession of the roads. 

In addition to the loss of supplies, means of transporta- 
tion, etc., caused by the seizure of the army's communica- 
tions, and which are severely felt, there is another consequence 
to be considered. This is the effect- produced by closing the 
natural line of retreat of the army. Hence, the reasons for 
insisting upon the great importance of protecting the lines of 
communications of an army. 

43. A long line of communication is more difficult to 
protect than a short one. Napoleon's Eussian campaign 
illustrates the danger attendant upon a long line of com- 
munication. As he advanced on Moscow, two corps of the 
Eussian army moved, one from Finland, the other from the 
south, to strike his line of communications. Their junction 
was to be made where this line crossed the Beresina, a branch 
of the Dnieper. The execution of this plan nearly resulted 
in the capture of Napoleon, and certainly caused the great 
disasters of that famous retreat. 

Objective Points. 

44. The point to be reached or gained by an army in ex- 
ecuting a movement, has been termed the "objective point." 

There are two classes of objectives, viz : natural and acci- 



STRATEGY. 25 

dental. The term geographical is frequently used to desig- 
nate the first of these. 

45. A natural objective may be an important position, 
strong naturally, or made so by fortifications, the possession 
of which gives control over a tract of country, and furnishes 
good points of support or good lines of defence for other mili- 
tary operations. Or, it may be a great business centre, or a 
capital of the country, the possession of which has the effect 
of discouraging the enemy and making him willing to sue 
for peace. 

46. Accidental objectives are dependent upon the mili- 
tary operations which have for their object the destruction 
or disintegration of the enemy's forces. These objectives are 
sometimes called " objective points of maneuver." 

The position of the enemy determines their location. 
Thus, if the enemy's forces are greatly scattered, or his front 
much extended, the central point of his position would be a 
good objective point, since the possession of it would divide 
the enemy's forces, and allow his detachments to be attacked 
separately. Or, if the enemy has his forces well supported, a 
good objective would be on that flank, the possession of 
which would allow his communications with his base to be 
threatened. 

It is well to remark that the term " point " used in this 
connection is not to be considered merely in its geometrical 
sense, but is used to apply to the object which the army 
desires to attain, whether it be a position, a place, a line, or 
even a section of country. 

47. Strategical fronts. The portion of the theatre of 
war in front of any position occupied by an army as it 



26 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

advances, is termed the "front of operations." That part 
which is directly in front of the army, or which can be 
reached in two or three days, forms simply a " front." When 
the whole extent lying between the two hostile armies is con- 
sidered, the term " strategical front " is applied. 

48. Strategical Points. Every point of the theatre of 
war, the possession of which is of great importance to an 
army in its military operations, is a "strategical point." 
These are points which an army acting on the offensive 
strives to gain and the army on the defensive strives to 
retain. 

The importance of a strategical point depends sometimes 
upon its natural or geographical position, and at others 
upon its position with reference to the enemy's forces. 

49. There are, therefore, as in objectives, two classes, 
viz. : Natural or Geographical, and Accidental. 

These are sometimes designated as permanent and tem- 
porary strategical points. 

50. Those strategical points whose possession insures suc- 
cess for a military operation are known as " decisive strate- 
gical points," or simply "decisive points." 

The capital of a country is a natural or geographical 
strategical point, and is frequently a decisive one. 

Any point which is strong naturally, or made so by arti- 
ficial means, and which commands the roads or routes inter- 
secting the theatre of war, or whose possession gives control 
of a tract of country, is a " natural strategical point." 

A point whose possession will give an advantage over the 
enemy, causing him to fight at a disadvantage, or retreat, is 
an " accidental strategical point," since it is frequently de- 



STRATEGY. 27 



pendent upon the positions of the contending forces at a 
particular time. It is generally a "decisive" point, for its 
possession insures success for the military operation with 
which it was connected. 

51. Natural strategical points are few in a country which 
is open and comparatively level. Fortified places and large 
cities are the most common in this case. The possession of 
a large city, which contains large supplies and is the centre 
of trade and commerce, would be of advantage to the invad- 
ing army, and hence a good strategical point. 

In broken, hilly and mountainous countries there will be 
found many natural strategical points. Such are the points 
at which several roads or lines of communication meet ; at 
which good positions are found commanding the passes 
through mountains ; or commanding the crossings of streams 
which are not fordable, etc. 

Hence, any position, strong naturally, or made so by for- 
tifications, which commands the junction of any system of 
roads, railroads, or other communications ; or commands a 
navigable stream or its crossings ; or commands the roads 
leading through passes over mountain ranges ; or commands 
and gives control over a tract of country, rich in population 
and supplies ; any one of these is a natural strategic point, 
whose possession is of great importance to an army operating 
in its neighborhood. 

A simple redoubt controlling a route may be a decisive 
strategical point for a particular operation. Thus a redoubt 
in the Montenotte pass in Bonaparte's campaign in Italy in 
1796, frustrated the Austrian movement and enabled Bona- 
parte to succeed in his operations. Also, in 1800, Fort Bard 



28 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR, 

in the valley of Aoste, came very near having a decisive ac- 
tion upon the military operations of Napoleon and defeating 
his plan of campaign. 

52. Objective therefore, are or should be " decisive strate- 
gical points." 



CHAPTER III. 



PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 



53. The term " campaign " is used to designate the time 
employed by an army in the field to accomplish a given ob- 
ject. 

54. Before a war is begun, or any military enterprise is 
undertaken, the object to be attained must be selected, and 
all the movements which are to be made by the army for the 
purpose of getting possession of this object must be fixed in 
advance as accurately as possible. 

These movements are made in accordance with some 
scheme, to which the term, " general plan of the war" is ap- 
plied. This "general plan " comprises the selection of the 
principal objects to be gained, the general combinations 
which are to be made for their attainment, and all the neces- 
sary preparations and arrangements to carry the combina- 
tions into effect. 

55. Political considerations audi" military policy" exer- 
cise considerable influence in the selection of the objects to 
be attained, and affect materially the proposed combinations. 

All considerations, not political, and not belonging to 
diplomacy or strategy, which influence military operations, 
are classed under the general head of "military policy." As 
for example, the kind of military system in use by the enemy ; 
the character and ability of the enemy's generals ; the char- 



30 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAK. 

acter of the executive; the possible influence of some particu- 
lar cabinet officer, or of cabinet councils ; the character of the 
masses of the people living in the enemy's country ; the degree 
of attachment felt by these masses for their form of govern- 
ment; the financial resources of the enemy, etc., would exercise 
an influence upon the plans to be formed, and would frequent- 
ly decide the kind of war to be waged. 

56. The " general plan of the war " is a project conceived 
and determined upon by a government after consultation with 
its military authorities. This plan may require the use of 
only a single army and a single campaign ; or it may require 
many armies and many campaigns for its fulfilment. 

57. In either case each army will require a plan of opera- 
tions for each campaign. This plan of operatioDs, designated 
as " the plan of campaign," will have for its aim some object 
whose possession forms a part of the " general plan." 

A "plan of campaign " comprises the selection of an ob- 
jective ; the selection of routes over which the army is to 
march ; the determination of the movements by which the 
objective is to be reached ; and all the arrangements to be 
made for providing the army with the necessary supplies 
during the time it is employed. 

58. The formation of the " general plan " is the act of the 
government ; the formation of " the plan of campaign " is, or 
should be, the act of the general entrusted with its execution. 

59. Assuming the plan of campaign to be intended for an 
army engaged in an offensive war — that is, for an army which 
is to move forward into the enemy's country — the attention 
of the student is particularly directed to four essential things, 
which are as follows : 



PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 31 

1. The selection of an objective. 

2. The selection of a " theatre of operations. " 

3. The selection of a base. 

4. The selection of " lines of operations." 

60. I. Objective. The first thing to be considered in 
forming a plan of campaign is the selection of an objective. 
This selection is made by the general who is to command the- 
army during the campaign, unless it has already been chosen 
by some higher authority. 

Sometimes there is no choice, the objective being deter- 
mined by the nature of things already existing. Thus in the 
case of a war waged for the purpose of quelling an insurrec- 
tion or crushing a rebellion, the objective would be the armed 
forces wherever they might be. In case the war was waged 
for the purpose of adding to a country's territory, the objec- 
tive would be the coveted portion ; and the plan would be to 
march into this part, drive out or crush all armed resistance,, 
occupy and hold the disputed territory. 

The Silesian wars of Frederick, waged by him to obtain 
possession of Silesia, are examples of the latter class. 

The duration of such wars would depend upon the abilities 
of the contestants to carry on the struggle. 

In the case of a war waged for a less definite purpose than 
either of those named, such as where a nation has gone to war 
to redress some wrong or to avenge an insult, the object of 
the general plan will be to show a superiority of strength, and 
the objective of a campaign will be the acquisition of some 
material guarantee as an evidence of this strength. 

This material guarantee may be an important sea-port ; 



32 ART AJfD SCIENCE OF WAR. 

an important centre of trade ; the capital of the country ; a 
fortified place, etc. 

The capital is always an important point to seize, as the 
occupation of the seat of government by a hostile power is so 
ruinous in its effect upon the nation, that almost any sacrifice 
made by the state is regarded as less hurtful than the presence 
of the enemy in its capital. 

The seizure of the city of Mexico by General Scott, in 
1847, is an example. And at a later date, the capture of 
Paris by the Germans, in 1871. In both of these cases the 
possession of the capital by the invading forces formed the 
objective of the general plan, and also the objective of par- 
ticular campaigns ; and this objective having been acquired, 
the war, in each instance, was virtually at an end. 

61. The actual possession of the capital is not, however, 
always the end of the war, and is not always sufficient to make 
the enemy sue for peace. 

So long as the enemy can raise armies and use them effect- 
ively, the possession of the capital forms only .a part of the 
general plan. The invader, in addition to seizing the capital, 
must show such a degree of superior skill and strength that 
the defenders, in order to save their armies from disintegra- 
tion and ruin, will be willing to submit to the terms proposed 
by the victorious foe. 

62. The objective selected for attainment in a campaign 
may be and most generally is natural, although it may be 
accidental. The kind of war and the general circumstances 
attending each case will influence the general in making his 
selection. He will endeavor, however, to select an objective 
which shall be a " decisive " one. 



PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 33 

63. The objective selected will oftentimes be attained 
only by gaining positions and strategical points, which form 
what are generally known as " secondary objectives." The 
possession of these latter marks the ending and beginning of 
successive epochs or periods of a campaign. The general 
principles, directing the operations of an army in attaining 
its principal objective, apply equally to all the movements 
which have for their object the possession of any of these 
secondary objectives. 

64. II. Theatre of operations. Usually, but not al- 
ways, the selection of the objective has the effect of fixing the 
selection of the theatre of operations. Even where there is but 
a single object to be attained, the theatre of war will contain 
portions of country which are more or less favorable for the 
operations of an army, or in which the operations will have 
a more or less decisive influence upon the results of the cam- 
paign. 

65. The selection on military grounds alone will be based 
upon the following considerations, viz. : 

1. The convenience and the security of the base. 

2. The nearness of the base to the objective. 

3. The number and the kind of communications leading 
from the base to the objective. 

4. The topographical features of the country through 
which the army must move to reach the objective. 

The effective use of the different arms of the military ser- 
vice is greatly dependent upon the natural features of the 
ground upon which the troops are to be employed. 

A country which is open is more suitable for the move- 
2* 



34 ART A^D SCIENCE OE WAR. 

ments of a cavalry force than one which is wooded, or inter- 
sected by ravines or other obstructions. 

A firm soil, good positions and good roads, are necessary 
for an effective nse of artillery. 

Any kind of country can be used by infantry. The 
choice between an open country or an obstructed one for in- 
fantry will depend upon circumstances. If the army consists 
principally of infantry and the enemy is superior in cavalry, 
a hilly or wooded region is to be preferred ; but if the army 
is superior to the enemy in cavalry and artillery, an open 
country would be selected, etc. 

The topographical features of the country through which 
the army is to move, will therefore, have a great influence in 
determining the selection of a theatre of operations whenever 
there is a choice between several theatres. 

66. III. Base of operations. The selection of the part 
of the country from which an army is to draw its supplies and 
to receive its reinforcements, and the selection of the theatre 
of operations are dependent upon each other. The selection 
of the theatre of operations usually fixes the base ; and the 
converse. 

The general in selecting his base of operations will duly 
consider the relative effects of form and extent which have 
already been mentioned. 

67. IV. Lines of operations. The theatre of operations 
affords generally a choice of lines of operations, as there are 
frequently several routes which can be nsed by the army in 
moving forward from its base towards the objective. 



PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 35 

As for example, in the campaigns of the late war with 
the Confederacy, advances were made upon Richmond, from 
the line of the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay, along 
different lines of operations at different times. One was by 
the way of Alexandria, Centreville, Warrenton, and Cul- 
pepper. Another was by the way of Acquia Creek and 
Fredericksburg. Another was by the York River, White 
House, and. the Chickahominy. Another was by the James 
River and Harrison's Landing. And another was by the 
James River, City Point and Petersburg. 

All these were used on different occasions and were se- 
lected at the time of using for reasons which were satisfac- 
tory to those planning the campaign. 

68. It has been stated that the causes influencing the 
selection of the theatre of operations and the base of opera- 
tions are mutually dependent on each other. So is the se- 
lection of the lines of operations influenced by the causes 
governing the selection of the base and theatre. The three 
are mutually dependent, and are to be considered together. 

The selection of the lines of operations is especially de- 
pendent upon the " number and kind of communications 
leading to the objective." 

The heavily loaded wagons following an army soon cut 
up and render the ordinary country roads almost impassable, 
and make it an extremely difficult thing to supply an army 
unless the distance between the depots of supplies and the 
troops is very short. 

Good roads are therefore essential, and they must be prac- 
ticable for all arms of service and their trains. Railroads 
which are in good repair, and are supplied with sufficient 



36 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

rolling stock, and streams which are navigable, form excel- 
lent lines of communication and are to be used in preference 
to ordinary roads when the distances are great. Turnpikes 
or macadamized roads are next in value to railroads. 

69. Good roads are essential not only for the supply of 
an army, but for the prompt execution of strategical niove- 
nients and tactical maneuvres. Col. Hamley says that "the 
march of the troops and artillery becomes, on bad roads, so 
slow and uncertain that all the calculations, on which a gen- 
eral bases a combined operation, are liable to be falsified ; and 
the rapidity necessary for a movement intended to surprise 
or foil an adversary is lost, so that the design is foreseen and 
frustrated by the enemy." 

He gives several examples of the rates of travel on good 
and bad roads, and the ill results flowing from using the 
latter. 

One of these examples given by him is that of Napoleon 
following Wellington, and Grouchy following Blucher, after 
the battle of Ligny and just before that of Waterloo. Both 
Napoleon and Grouchy left the field of Ligny on the after- 
noon of the 17th of June, 1815. Napoleon, with twenty-five 
thousand men marching on the paved high-roads, reached 
Waterloo, a distance of seventeen miles from Ligny, the 
same night. 

Grouchy, with thirty thousand men marching along the 
country roads, had great difficulty in reaching, by ten 
o'clock that night, Gembloux which was distant only five 
miles from Ligny. 

This example illustrates the difference in the rate of march 
of an army over good and poor roads. 



PLAltf OF CAMPAIGN. 37 

The recent war of the United States with the Southern 
Confederacy presents many examples of operations paralyzed, 
and plans defeated, in consequence of the miserable state of 
the roads over which the armies had to march. 

70. The selection of the objective, the theatre, base, and 
lines of operations, having been made, the general can now, 
complete his plan of campaign. 

It is supposed that he is to command an army that is well 
organized, in good discipline, properly supplied, and not 
inferior in numbers to those opposed to him. 

To make his plan complete, he must know the probable 
resistance he will meet in striving to reach his objective. 
This resistance, so far as the enemy is concerned, may be 
approximately estimated, if he can ascertain the probable 
numbers and kinds of troops which the enemy will bring 
against him, the degree of discipline existing among them, 
and the character of the general who is to command them. 

The knowledge of these three things will materially 
affect and in many cases materially modify his strategical 
combinations. 

A movement, which may be made with impunity in the 
presence of undisciplined troops, would be a very rash one in 
the presence of good troops. A faulty movement made in 
safety in the presence of troops commanded by a slow, hesi- 
tating and exceedingly cautious general, would result in 
disaster if made in their presence when commanded by a 
quick and able general. 

These things fully considered, the supply department well 
organized, the depots and magazines established, the proposed 
movements well considered, the plan of campaign is com- 



38 AET AN"D SCIENCE OF WAR. 

plete and the operations are begun. The thing to be 
observed is that every thing connected with the proposed 
movements should be considered and arranged in advance 
as far as practicable, and as far as human foresight will admit ; 
and nothing, or as little as possible, should be left to chance. 

71. Yet, notwithstanding the arrangements made and 
plans proposed, there are an infinite number of circum- 
stances occurring constantly, which tend to, and do, modify 
the plan conceived by the general. The most important of 
these are the topographical features of the country, the 
influence of climate, the kinds of troops opposing the move- 
ments, and the genius of the general in command of them. 

A knowledge of the solution of previous military prob- 
lems, and a knowledge of military geography, are both essen- 
tial to any one who desires to make a plan of campaign 
which should carry with it success. 

Example illustrative of a selection of theatre 
and line of operations in forming a plan of 
campaign. 

The Campaign of Bonaparte in Italy, in 1800, 

ending with the battle of Marengo, may be taken as an 
example in which a choice was made in selecting the theatre 
and lines of operations for a campaign. 

In 1800, Austria and France were at war. Austria had 
two large armies actively employed in hostilities ; one num- 
bered about one hundred and fifty thousand men, under the 
command of the Austrian General Kray, and the other, 
about one hundred and twenty thousand men under Gen- 
eral Melas. The army under Kray was posted with its 



PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 39 

left near Constance in Switzerland, its right in the denies of 
the Black Forest near Strasburg. and its centre at Donan- 
Eschingen. This latter place is about twenty-five miles 
north of Schaffhausen and is the junction of the main roads 
leading from the Rhine into the valley of the upper Danube. 

General Kray holding this position, could observe all the 
roads crossing the Ehine upon which the French might be 
expected to move in case of an attempted invasion of Austria. 
Making this his principal object, Kray acted on the defensive. 

The Austrian army under Melas was in Northern Italy, 
about to take the offensive, with the object of gaining pos- 
session of Genoa and. Nice, then in the hands of the French ; 
and then crossing the river Var, to march upon Toulon. 

It is seen that these two armies were separated by Swit- 
zerland and were not in supporting distance of each other. 
Nevertheless, communication with each other through the 
Tyrol was in case of necessity, possible, after a short delay. 

France had opposed to these armies, troops in Holland, 
along the lower Rhine, in Switzerland, and in Italy. 

This was the condition of tilings in March, 1800, a short 
time after Bonaparte's accession to the position of First Con- 
sul. He, Bonaparte, having failed in his negotiations for 
peace, determined to act offensively against both of these 
armies. 

He consolidated the armies in Switzerland and on the 
Rhine into one, to be known as the " army of the Rhine," 
increased its numbers to one hundred and thirty thousand 
men, and placed it under the command of General Moreau, 
with instructions to attack Kray. 

He sent Massena to Italy to take command of all the 



40 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

French troops in that country, with instructions to hold Ge- 
noa to the last extremity. It is well to remark that no 
reinforcements were sent to this French army in Italy, and 
that this army was in need of supplies of every description. 
He, Bonaparte, then organized a third army which was to 
be known as the "army of the reserve," with which he pro- 
posed to act against the Austrians, as soon as the proper time 
for action had arrived. The campaign of this "army of the 
reserve " is the example taken to illustrate the subject under 
consideration. 

Bonaparte's Plan. He selected Northern Italy as the 
theatre of operations for "the army of the reserve," and 
determined that as soon as he had heard of Moreau having 
defeated Kray, or having driven him back upon Ulm and 
Katisbon, that he would march the army under his command 
into Italy, place it between the army of Melas and its base, 
and thus having possession of Melas' communications, force 
the Austrians to raise the siege of Genoa which they had 
begun, and force them to fight a battle to regain these com- 
munications. 

Position of the Austrian armies. In the beginning of 
May, 1800, Kray's army was to all practicable purposes in the 
position already described ; but had Moreau directly in his 
front, threatening to turn the right flank of his position. 

The army of Melas had moved forward in pursuit of its 
objects and, at this time, had its right, south of the Apen- 
nines, threatening a crossing of the Var, and its left besieging 
Genoa. It also guarded all the passes through which the 
principal roads lead from France to Italy across the Apen- 
nines. The front of the army of Melas may be said to have 



PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 41 

extended along the whole of the Italian frontier of France, 
its left resting on Genoa. 

It will be seen then that all the lines of communication 
and retreat for the army under Melas, leading to Mantua 
and Verona, pass through the space lying between Milan and 
Piacenza. 

If Bonaparte could place his army in this space, while 
the Austrians were still occupying the position just described, 
he would be able to cut their communications, and force 
them to concentrate against him. In doing so, the Aus- 
trians would be forced to raise the siege of Genoa, and to 
abandon their attempted invasion of France by crossing the 
river Yar. 

Northern Italy having been selected as the theatre of opera- 
tions, Bonaparte now selects this country between Milan and 
Piacenza as the objective of the campaign in this theatre. 

The next, is to select the line of operations. The map 
shows that Northern Italy is divided by the Apennines and 
the river Po, into three unequal portions, through all of 
which, roads lead from the French frontier to the country 
between Milan and Piacenza. The narrowest one of these 
three portions is that lying between the Mediterranean Sea 
and the Apennines, which from its width and mountainous 
character was peculiarly fitted for the operations of a force 
composed principally of infantry, inferior to the enemy in 
artillery and cavalry, and inferior in numbers. 

As Bonaparte's army was inferior to the Austrians in 
numbers, and inferior also in artillery and cavalry, it would 
seem that this portion would be the one he would select by 
which to move to the relief of Genoa. 



42 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

His objections to this selection were, that supposing he 
was successful in pushing the Austrians back after he had 
orossed the river Var, they, as they retired from position to po- 
sition, would be constantly reinforced, and could at the same 
time keep up the siege of G-enoa. And finally, if defeated 
before Genoa, they could retreat and find shelter under the 
fortifications on the Mincio and Adige. He would also fail, 
~by this movement, to place his army in the rear of the Aus- 
trian army, while they were occupying the position just de- 
scribed. This portion was therefore rejected as not suitable. 

The middle portion lying between the Apennines and the 
river Po, possessed good roads, but also possessed the strong 
fortifications of Coni, Turin and Alexandria, all in the hands, 
or under the control, of the Austrians. 

His objections to this portion were, that supposing he had 
■crossed the Apennines and advanced against the Austrian 
forces, the fortified places would enable the Austrians to 
hold him in check long enough to allow time for the Aus- 
trian army to concentrate its scattered forces. Approachiug 
&s he would the Austrian centre, the concentration would be 
more easily effected, and any point more easily reinforced, 
than if he moved against either of the flanks of their posi- 
tion. The Austrians having possession of the passes of the 
Apennines, could also delay the French advance upon Genoa 
-and could still prosecute the siege. This portion was there- 
fore decided as not suitable for the execution of his plan. 

The third portion lies between the river Po and the 
Alps. The narrow passes of the Alps, through which 
the rugged, difficult, and bad roads were carried, the deep 
snows on the mountains, etc., all seemed to make imprac- 



PLAN OF CAMPAIGN". 4$ 

ticable an approach of an army in that direction from 
France. For this reason, there were but few fortifica- 
tions and but few troops in this portion. If Bonaparte 
conld get his army over the Alps without Melas knowing of 
the movement, there would be no hinderance to his marching- 
directly to the space he proposed to occupy, and to seize the 
communications of Melas with his base on the Mincio, thus- 
carrying out that part of his plan of operations. Moreover,, 
if Moreau was successful in pushing back Kray to Ulm r 
reinforcements from Moreau's army could be sent across 
Switzerland and used to strengthen the Army of the Ke- 
serve, before Kray could know of it. 

The Austrians having no fears of an army descending- 
into Italy by crossing the Alps, had guarded but weakly the 
roads leading from France into this portion of Italy, trusting 
to the natural difficulties of the roads as affording sufficient 
protection. 

Bonaparte, disregarding these difficulties, determined,, 
that as soon as he heard of Moreau's success, he would cross 
the Alps, place his army in this third portion of Italy, and 
proceed to execute the plan already mentioned. 

On the 11th of May, Kray's army had been forced back 
upon Ulm, and on the 13th Bonaparte put his army in 
motion. 

He crossed the main body of his army by the Great St. 
Bernard Pass. The reinforcements from Moreau crossed 
the Alps by the St. Gothard Pass. 

A knowledge of the difficulties of this march, of the 
means adopted to overcome these obstacles, of the serious ob- 
struction offered by the little fort at Bard, guarding the 



44 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

valley of the Aosta, etc., is essential to a complete under- 
standing of this campaign, but it is not necessary to have this 
knowledge so far as the subject now under consideration is 
concerned. 

The crossing of the Alps was effected, and in thirteen days 
from the time of starting, Bonaparte and his army were in 
northern Italy. 

Guarding with strong detachments the crossings of the 
Ticino, Bonaparte marched his army to the space between 
Milan and Piacenza and seized the roads leading from the 
Austrian front to Verona and to Mantua. 

He was too late to relieve Genoa, Massena having been 
obliged to surrender, but the delay of the Austrians before 
Genoa, caused by Massena's obstinate defence, gave Bona- 
parte time to place his army in the rear of the Austrians. 

The Austrian army was forced to fight in order to regain 
its communications. The battle of Marengo, which was the 
result, was a victory for the French, and was followed by the 
surrender of Genoa, and the evacuation of Italy by the 
Austrians. 

Other examples of a choice made in the selection of 
theatres and lines of operations are to be met with, when 
reading the history of campaigns made by famous generals. 



CHAPTER IV. 

COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 

72. The term army is applied to a collection of armed 
men, arranged in organizations and paid by a government. 
The term is restricted in its use to those armed forces whose 
sphere of action is on land. 

The composition of an army is fixed by the government 
and usually differs in time of war, from what it is in time of 
peace. B 

73. An army should, however, in time of peace, have its 
parts so composed that if the necessity arises it could, in a 
short time, be readily placed on a war footing; or, as it is 
frequently expressed, "mobilized" 

An army, thus mobilized, should be capable of executing 
the tasks that are to be imposed upon it. It must be so or- 
ganized that the whole must obey a single will; the will of a 
commander who directs its movements and causes the whole 
to act for the attainment of a common purpose. 

The army must be so constituted as to bind together the 
general who commands and the common soldier who exe- 
cutes, if the whole is to act as a unit and in accordance with 
the wishes of the commander. 

74. Its organization may be said to be begun by group- 
ing those combatants who have the same mode of action. 
These groups are known as "arms of service" 



46 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

An arm of service may be defined to be ( l a union of com- 
batants having the same mode of action." 

75. There are four of these arms in modern armies, viz. : 
Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers. 

These four arms form the principal part of a mobilized 
army, and as they, or their representatives, are always formed 
into a line of battle to resist the attack of an enemy, or to 
make an attack, they are generally known as the " line of the 
army" or "troops of the line," to distinguish them from 
other bodies of men who form parts of an army. 

These arms are sub-divided into fractions, for the purpose 
of instruction and of supply. The unit for instruction and 
the unit for supply may be the same or different. The unit 
of supply, as a general rule, is constant, and is also usually 
the unit of instruction in discipline. The unit of instruction 
in tactics will depend upon circumstances, and upon the kind 
of movements which the commander desires to make. 

76. The common unit for the four arms, for supplying the 
men's wants and for instruction in discipline, is the "company." 
This unit receives, at other times, other names, depending 
upon circumstances. For instance, a lattery of artillery is 
the same as company; the term squadron of cavalry frequent- 
ly means a company, etc. 

A company consists of a given number of men command- 
ed by a commissioned officer who has the rank of captain. 

Two, sometimes three and even more, commissioned offi- 
cers of a grade below that of captain are appointed to assist 
the captain in the discharge of his duties. These officers 
have the grade of lieutenant. Their number and the number 
of men forming a company are fixed by law. 



COMPOSITION OF AX ARMY. 47 

A certain number are selected from the men, and ap- 
pointed non-commissioned officers with, the rank of sergeant 
or of corporal. These non-commissioned officers are used to 
instruct the men in their military duties and in discipline. 

77. The number of men and officers forming a company 
is usually greater in time of war than in time of peace. Ex- 
perience has fixed upon a minimum of one captain, two lieu- 
tenants, four sergeants, four corporals and sixty-four private 
soldiers for the proper number to form an efficient company 
of infantry in time of peace. 

A company of this size is divided into two equal parts 
called platoo7is, each of which should be under the especial 
charge of a lieutenant. 

The whole company should be divided into four squads of 
equal numbers, and each squad placed under the charge of a 
non-commissioned officer, who should be held responsible for 
the cleanliness of the men of his squad, not only as to their 
persons, clothing and arms, but also as to their tents or 
quarters. 

It will be easy with a company thus organized to instruct 
the soldier in "minor tactics" as far as the "school of the 
company;" to discipline him and teach him strict obedience 
to orders from all superior authority, and to supply his neces- 
sary wants. 

78. By the addition of fifty men to this organization the 
company will have sufficient strength for active field service. 
With this number of men added to the company, the captain 
will then have as many under his command as one man, on 
foot, can attend to while executing the movements demanded 
by modern tactics. A greater number might be added, form- 



48 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

ing larger companies, but such large companies would neces- 
sitate the mounting of the captain on a horse so as to enable 
him to execute properly his duties. Larger companies are 
not expedient, unless the captain is mounted; their size can 
be excused only on account of deficiency of numbers of good 
officers, or on the score of economy. 

The company, with its size based on the theory that it 
must not be larger than one man on foot can thoroughly com- 
mand in person, is the unit of organization. 

79. Two or three or more companies form a battalion. 
Tour, and at the outside, five companies placed in line form, 
in these times, so extended a line that a single person in im- 
mediate and personal command of them will find difficulty in 
making himself heard and understood by the men through- 
out the entire line. For this reason the battalion should not, 
as a rule, contain more than four companies. 

The battalion is the tactical unit, both for instruction in 
tactics and in the execution of its movements. The battalion 
is sometimes made a unit of administration, and forms a com- 
plete organization under the command of a commissioned 
officer of the grade of major or lieutenant-colonel. 

80. The more usual rule is to increase the number of 
companies so as to have enough to form at least two battalions, 
and with these companies to form the organization known as 
a regiment. The regiment is always an administrative unit 
and is commanded by a commissioned officer who has the 
grade of colonel. The colonel is charged with the proper ad- 
ministration of the supplies for the regiment, and with pre- 
serving good order and promoting military discipline. He 
takes every opportunity to instruct both the officers and men 



COMPOSITION OF AN" ARMY. 49 

in the principles and details of all movements that ought, in 
any case, to be made by a battalion. 

He sees that the company officers do their duty, that the 
men are satisfied, and that the regiment is in an efficient 
state. 

Upon the organization of a regiment, the company officers 
are assigned to companies, and each company is designated 
by a letter of the alphabet. Upon the recommendation of 
the captains, the colonel appoints the non-commissioned 
officers of the companies. He appoints an adjutant from the 
lieutenants of the regiment, and a non-commissioned staff 
from the enlisted men to assist him in his duties. He selects 
from the lieutenants, a quarter-master, who receives his ap- 
pointment from higher authority. 

81. The elements of organization for the other three arms 
of service are practically the same, being that of a company 
or similar body of men under the command of a captain, and 
these units grouped together into a battalion or regimental 
organization for administrative purposes. 

The number of men in a company is different for the dif- 
ferent arms, a larger number being required for a company 
of engineers than for a company of infantry, etc. The num- 
ber for each arm should be fixed by practical experience, and 
should be sufficient to allow of thorough instruction in all the 
duties which the men may have to perform in time of war. 

82. This sub-division into companies and into regiments 
is most essential for instruction in discipline. Discipline is 
an indispensable condition for the existence of a good army. 
It imparts cohesion and flexibility to the armed mass. With- 
out discipline an army is only an armed mob over which a 

3 



50 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

commander would have no control, and upon which he could 
not rely in the execution of his plans. 

The discipline of an army greatly depends upon the cap- 
tains and upon the colonels. If they are efficient, the com- 
panies and regiments become real units, and the army, under 
the command of an experienced general, obeys a single will. 

83. When the army is to be mobilized the regiments are 
brought together and organized into brigades and divisions. 

Two or more regiments form a brigade; two or more 
brigades form a division. 

A general officer of the grade of Brigadier-general is as- 
signed to the command of a brigade, and one of the grade of 
Major-general to the command of a division. 

These divisions and brigades may be composed entirely of 
one arm, or they may be composed of troops belonging to all 
four of the arms. 

84. The division is the unit of organization and adminis- 
tration of a mobilized army, and is also the tactical unit of the 
general in command. 

When the army is very large, three or four divisions are 
joined together and form an army corps. The officer, com- 
manding an army corps, should be of a higher grade than he 
who commands a division. This grade, in the U. S. army, 
would be that of Lieutenant-general. 

An army corps is most generally composed of all arms of 
service, and is, to all intents and purposes, an army complete 
in itself. 

Two or more army corps, or armies, would be under the 
command of the general, or of a "general-in -chief." 

85. It is to be observed that the functions of general offi- 



COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 51 

cers are to command armies, or fractions of an army greater 
than a regiment, when mobilized. In time of peace, when the 
regiments are not formed into brigades or divisions, but are 
distributed over districts of country, the function of the 
general is to command the troops in these districts, which 
are then designated by the terms "military departments," 
or "geographical military divisions." 

86. A general in command of an army, or of one of these 
districts, cannot attend in person to all the duties which such 
a command imposes. He must therefore have persons to 
assist him. These assistants form the "staff" of the gen- 
eral. Their duties are to transmit the orders of the general, 
either verbally or in writing, to those for whom they are 
intended ; to make condensed reports of the numbers, of the 
positions, and state of the different parts of the army ; 
to make inspections of the troops, their quarters, etc. ; to 
supply the troops with shelter, fuel, etc. ; to supply them 
with arms and ammunition, clothing, food, etc. ; to provide 
them with medical and surgical attendance, hospital com- 
forts, and to care for their health ; to supervise the legal 
proceedings arising from infractions of military law and dis- 
cipline, etc. ; to pay them their wages, etc. 

87. This great variety of duties makes it necessary to 
employ a large number of assistants, and to divide the labors 
among them. 

Hence, there has arisen an organization, forming an es- 
sential part of every army, known as the General Staff, 
and divided into corps and departments to which are as- 
signed special duties. 

In some cases, the term "'general staff "is limited to 



•52 ART a:nt> science of war. 

include only those officers who are used by the general to 
communicate his orders, and to inform him of the general 
and particular conditions of the troops ; and the term " staff 
department" or "supply department" is used to include 
those officers whose duties are confined to distinct branches 
of service having for their object the supply of troops. 

88. When an army is mobilized, or when a general is 
placed in command of troops occupying a given district of 
country, commissioned officers belonging to these corps and 
departments are ordered to report to the general in com- 
mand. He assigns these officers to the head-quarters of 
the army or district, or to divisions, or brigades, as he may 
think fit, unless this distribution has already been regu- 
lated by the War Department. 

The senior in rank of each corps or department is usually 
assigned to duty at the commanding general's head-quarters. 

If the army is one of any great size, the general ordi- 
narily attaches to his head-quarters a representative of the 
three arms, of artillery, cavalry and engineers, giving them 
the position of staff-officers with the name of "chief of 
artillery," "chief of cavalry," etc. They are required to 
keep the general informed of the state of supplies, and 
whatever concerns their particular arm, in a similar manner 
to that required of the other officers of the staff. 

The general also appoints from the subordinate officers 
belonging to his command, a certain number of aids-de- 
camp. These officers are ex-officio, adjutant-generals, and 
receive orders only from the general himself. They are con- 
fidential officers, who are supposed to be used only in delicate 
and difficult duties where they may in a degree represent 



COMPOSITION OF AN" ARMY. 53 

the general. Hence, they are entrusted to deliver verbal 
orders which cannot be entrusted with propriety to enlisted 
men or to the ordinary means of communication. 

It is supposed that their knowledge is sufficiently com- 
prehensive to enable them to understand the object and pur- 
pose of the general's orders, and to modify them in an emer- 
gency or to return in time to the general for new instructions. 

89. Proportion of Arms of Service. The mass of a 
modern army is composed of infantry. The amount of cav- 
alry will depend upon the topographical features of the 
country, being in some cases as much as one-fourth of the 
infantry, and in others as little as one-tenth. 

The amount of light artillery depends upon the charac- 
ter of the country. There should be at least two guns to 
every thousand men. 

The quantity of heavy artillery, or number of siege-bat- 
teries, which enter the composition of an army, will depend 
to a great extent upon the plan of campaign and the proba- 
ble uses for which they may be intended. The circum- 
stances of the case in each campaign will therefore decide as 
to the proportion to be employed. The number of engineer 
troops will depend both on the nature of the country and on 
the probable amount of work which will be required from this 
class of troops. Each division should contain at least one 
company of engineer troops. It is usual, if there be none, to 
detail one or more companies of infantry to act as engineer 
soldiers; they are designated as " pioneers-." 

These engineer troops, or troops acting in that capacity, 
marching in the advance, make the roads practicable for the 
command by repairing them, removing obstructions, etc. 



S4 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

At the crossings of streams, where bridges are to be made, 
or where existing bridges are to be repaired to an extent re- 
quiring more knowledge of bridge construction than that 
usually possessed by the pioneer, another detachment of 
troops belonging to the engineer arm is brought forward to 
do the work. These troops are known as pontoniers, and 
have special charge of bridge construction for the army. 
They may be divided into two parts : one, to have charge 
of construction of temporary bridges, especially floating and 
trestle bridges, and construction of ferries ; the other, to 
nave charge of repairs of bridges which have been broken or 
injured by the enemy, and where quick repair is of impor- 
tance to the army's movements. 

These troops charged with bridge construction usually 
form a part of the reserve and are only attached to a division 
under peculiar circumstances. There should be also in the 
reserve, several companies of sappers and miners ; their num- 
ber, like the heavy artillery, being dependent upon the nature 
of the campaign. 

90. The army, as a machine, is now ready to be used by 
the general. The next step is to keep it in a condition so 
that it can be used; in other words, to preserve the fighting 
condition of the army. The discipline and drill have been 
cared for, and with the organization just sketched out, the 
general can move the whole mass as a unit in accordance with 
liis will. 

91. How the army shall be kept in this condition, is the 
next question. 

The army can be kept ready for use only by supplying all 
the actual and necessary wants of the soldier, and by keep- 



COMPOSITION OF AN" ARMY. 55 

ing him in comfort and good health. To do this, there 
must be ammunition, food, clothing, shelter, medicines,, 
surgical attendance, hospital comforts, etc., provided for his 
use. Also a good system of recruiting must be adopted, by 
means of which the natural losses due to sickness and death 
may be made good. 

92. The supplies furnished to the soldier being so varied 
in their nature, it is easy to see how natural has been the 
formation of separate departments for these special purposes. 

Thus, in the United States army, the Department of 
Ordnance provides the supplies of ammunition; the Subsist- 
ence Department supplies food; the Quartermasters Depart- 
ment provides clothing, fuel, quarters, tents, forage, etc. ^ 
the Medical Department provides surgical attendance, med- 
icines, etc. 

The officers, in charge of these departments of a mobilized 
army, should receive their orders direct from the command- 
ing general, and be directly responsible to him for the effi- 
ciency of their departments. 

93. The transportation of the munitions, equipments,, 
provisions, hospital supplies, tents, engineering tools, bridge- 
equipage and boats, baggage, cooking utensils, etc., neces- 
sary for the use of an army moving against an enemy, requires 
the use of large numbers of wagons and a great number of 
draught- animals. These accompaniments to the army re- 
ceived from the Eomans the name of impedimenta, for the 
reason that they hindered the movements of the army. 

In recent wars, by reason of the immense number of men 
employed, and in consequence of the bad roads along which 
the wagons moved, the difficulties of supplying the troops 



56 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

promptly and in abundance, were greatly increased ; and the 
wagon trains were in truth impedimenta. 

94. These supply departments form important parts of 
the composition of a modern army, and the method of exe- 
cuting the duties assigned them constitutes an important 
branch of the "science and art of war." 

95. Nothing has been said, so far, as to the means of 
raising the requisite numbers of men, with which and from 
which the army is to be formed. The men required for use 
in an army in time of peace are supplied in different ways in 
different countries. The two principal methods are volun- 
tary enlistment, and conscription. Voluntary enlistment ex- 
plains itself. Conscription is where the man is selected by 
lot from a list of all persons liable for military service in a 
given locality. 

The former is the method adopted by the United States 
Government. 

The details of this method of procuring men for the army 
are entrusted to " the Eecruiting Service," conducted by the 
Adjutant-General of the Army under the direction of the 
War Department. Eecruits .may be enlisted into special 
arms of service, into special organizations, or into the gen- 
eral service ; in the latter case, they are afterwards assigned 
to such arm and organization as the head of the recruiting 
service may direct. 

The recruits received at a "rendezvous" are sent as soon 
as practicable to the "recruiting depot" where they are kept 
until sufficient numbers are gathered together for assignment. 
They are then assigned to an arm and to a regiment, and 
upon reaching the regiment are distributed among the com- 



COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 5? 

panies under the orders of the commanding officers of the 
regiment. 

96. Military Forces of the United States. The 

military forces of the United States consist, at the present 
time, of the Regular Army of the United States, and the 
Militia of the different States. 

97. Regular Army. The regular army of the United 
States consists of twenty-five regiments of Infantry, ten regi- 
ments of Cavalry, five regiments of Artillery and one battal- 
ion of engineer soldiers ; the total number of enlisted men 
not to exceed 25,000. 

It is also provided with a corps of Adjutant Generals ; of 
Inspector Generals ; of Quarter-masters ; of Subsistence ; of 
Engineers ; of Ordnance ; a Medical Corps ; a corps of Pay- 
masters ; a chief Signal Officer ; a Bureau of Military Jus- 
tice ; a number of chaplains ; a force of Indian scouts ; the 
officers on the retired list ; and the professors and cadets of 
the United States Military Academy. 

98. In command of these, there are eleven general offi- 
cers, viz. : one General, one Lieutenant-General, three Ma- 
jor-Generals and six Brigadier-Generals, with the proviso 
that the offices of General and of Lieutenant-General shall 
cease when a vacancy occurs in either of them. 

99. The student is referred to the United States Army 
Eegister for a tabulated statement of the organization of the 
Regular Army of the United States, and for a table showing 
the Organization of Eegiments and Companies. It is un- 
necessary to insert these tables in this book, for at present 
they may be simply regarded as variable quantities, possess- 
ing a given value only for a limited time. 



58 ART A2SD SCIEXCE OF WAR. 

Penuriousness and over-scrupulousness urged forward by 
local interests or party spirit seem to be the reasons control- 
ling all plans suggested for the improvement of the present 
organization, rather than a desire to watch over and preserve 
such an army as will be of service to the country in the future. 

Therefore, any organization authorized by law and experi- 
ence existing at the time of writing these lines may be so en- 
tirely changed by legislation before the year ends, as not to 
be recognizable to a pains-taking student ; and it is better to 
refer him for the details of such organization to the current 
literature of the day. 

100. Militia. The laws of the United States require the 
enrollment into the militia of all able-bodied males between, 
the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, excepting those 
which are exempted by the laws of the United States, or may 
be exempted by the laws of the different States. 

The militia of each State is required to be arranged into 
companies, battalions, regiments, brigades and divisions, as 
the legislature of the State may direct, and it shall be subject 
to military duty and shall serve a definite time. 

These organizations are to be officered by the respective 
States, the grades and number of officers being named in the 
laws requiring the enrollment. 

The militia may be or may not be uniformed ; and, except 
in especial cases, are not paid for their services. 

101. There have been, however, found in every State, even 
where the militia is not uniformed, bodies of men, voluntarily 
associated together for military exercises, wearing a uniform, 
bearing some characteristic name, and frequently obtaining- 
some special privileges. 



COMPOSITION OF AX ARMY. 59 

These men are engaged in business operations which pre- 
vent their leaving home but for a short time, and as a rule 
receive no pay for their services. Although militia, they are 
distinguished from the general militia by the term "volunteer." 

102. The Constitution of the United States has given the 
power to Congress to provide for calling " forth the militia to 
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and 
repel invasions." Congress, by legislation, has given the 
President the authority to call forth the militia under certain 
exigencies, as has been frequently done. When called into 
actual service of the United States, the militia receive pay 
from the government and are subject to the Eules and Arti- 
cles of War. 

The militia is therefore a part and parcel of the army of 
the United States, although in common use the term is limit- 
ed to mean the regular army alone. 

103. Volunteers. There is another class of troops not 
belonging to the regular army, nor to the militia, which have 
been raised by Congress and employed by the government. 
These troops are known as "volunteers" and must not be 
confounded with the militia formed into volunteer companies. 

When a sudden emergency demands, these volunteers are 
employed by authority of Congress, which gives the President 
the power to call for volunteers, limiting the number to be 
employed, and denning the proportions of the arms of service 
which they are to represent. As a rule the numbers of vol- 
unteers are proportioned among the States according to their 
population, and complete organizations of companies, battal- 
ions and regiments, are formed in each State and officered by 
the Governor of the State. 



60 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

These organizations, when received into actual service of 
the United States, are arranged into brigades and divisions 
by the United States officers, and are commanded by general 
officers who, with their staff-officers, receive their appoint- 
ments from the United States. 

This makes an essential difference between them and the 
militia. And although these organizations assume the names 
of the States in which they volunteered for service, they are 
truly United States and not State troops, nor militia. They 
are troops raised by Congress, and although the company and 
regimental officers have been usually appointed by the gover- 
nors of States, it is a permission granted, not a right yielded 
by Congress, to allow the officers to be appointed in that 
manner. 

Hence, when employed by the government, they form a 
part of the army of the United States, and in organization, 
rights, etc., have the same privileges as the organizations of 
the regular army. 

104. The army of the United States may then be said to 
be composed of the 

Regular Army, whose commissioned officers hold commis- 
sions for an indefinite period, and whose non-commissioned 
officers and privates enlist or engage to serve the United 
States for a definite period ; 

Volunteers, whose commissioned officers, non-commis- 
sioned officers and privates have volunteered to serve the 
United States for a definite period ; 

Paid Militia, whose officers, non-commissioned officers 
and privates, are enrolled according to law and are subject 
to military duty for a definite period. 



COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 61 

105. It will be observed that both the regular army 
and the volunteers serve the United States voluntarily, and 
that the militia, when the emergency comes, have no option 
in the matter, but if liable to duty, must serve in the army 
when called forth. 

106. Congress raises, supports, governs, and regulates 
armies in the United States. 

Raising is the means used to collect and to orgauize the 
troops ; Supporting is the system of administration em- 
ployed ; Government is the formation of the military hie- 
rarchy, with rules for rewarding and punishing ; and Regu- 
lations are the means of determining precisely the rights and 
duties of every individual in the army and of deciding upon 
the systems of tactics to be practiced. 

Formation of Troops. 

107. A tactical unit placed upon the ground assumes, 
when threatened with an attack, a position or figure which 
is known as the "formation" of this unit. 

That portion of the formation on the side towards the 
enemy is called the "front;" the side opposite to the front 
is termed the " rear ;" the lateral extremities are called 
"flanks." 

Any row of soldiers placed parallel to the front is 
called a " rank ;" a row perpendicular to the front is called 
a "file;" the number of ranks measures the "depth" of 
the formation. 

Troops drawn up so as to show an extended front, with 
slight depth, are said to be "deployed;" when the depth is 
considerable and the front comparatively small, they are 
said to be in a "ployed" formation. 



62 AET ASTD SCIENCE OF WAR. 

The extent of front which a battalion of infantry should 
have when drawn np in line was denned, when it was 
stated that the battalion organization should not be so great 
as to prevent the voice of the commanding officer from being 
heard by the men on the extremities. This extent of front 
will fix the proper number of men for a battalion. 

A distance of one hundred and fifty, and even as great as 
two hundred yards has been assumed to be the length of a 
suitable front. 

With a front of two hundred yards, and an allowance of 
one pace for each man, there would be a few over two hun- 
dred and fifty men in a single rank, and five hundred in 
two ranks. The number of companies to form such a bat- 
talion can be easily determined. 

108. The formation in two ranks is the one used by 
infantry on parades and in line of battle. In an actual 
engagement, it rapidly becomes a single rank. 

Since a single rank would not be strong enough to resist 
a vigorous attack of the enemy, or it would not, at least, be 
safe to trust to it, a line formed of two ranks must be near 
at hand to support the single rank, or to receive the attack 
when this rank is driven back. 

The attack in masses of great depth, or columns, may be 
said to have been abandoned. Still, in order that an attack 
shall be successful, all other things being equal, a preponder- 
ance of fire, and therefore of numbers of men must be brought 
to bear upon the position to be taken. 

Since it is not expedient to expose troops under fire when 
drawn up in formations of a greater depth than two ranks, it 
becomes essential that the formation be so arranged that it 



COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 63 

can, under such circumstances, pass rapidly from a deep form- 
ation into a thin line, or as known in minor tactics, pass 
quickly "from column into line." 

109. Cavalry is governed by the same general rules laid 
down for infantry. 

The tactical unit of cavalry cannot have so great a front 
as that for infantry, because of the noise produced by the 
horses and by the rattling of the arms, which drown the 
voice of the commander. A length of about one-half of that 
determined for the battalion is ordinarily taken as a suitable 
one for the front of the tactical unit of cavalry. 

Cavalry is drawn up in two ranks. One rank is all that 
is effective as far as the offensive is concerned ; the second 
rank being most useful in pushing the front rank forward 
and filling the vacancies caused by casualties. 

110. It would seem that if for the same front the depth 
of the formation vary, the effect produced by it would be 
in the ratio with the mass. This is not the case, as it is 
simply impossible for the whole body to act as a compact 
mass. The question then returns to the use of cavalry in 
its most general sense. Upon this use the formation de- 
pends. 

The modern fire-arm renders a charge of a mass of cavalry 
upon a firm body of infantry a matter of impracticability. 
Cavalry to be effective must dismount and fight on foot, as 
long as the enemy makes resistance worthy of the name. 
The enemy in a disorganized condition, or retreating, can be 
effectively annoyed by cavalry. As sentinels, patrols, as 
couriers, or advanced guards, on reconnoissance, etc., cavalry 
performs an essential part ; and its formation of two ranks 



<54 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

offers many and great conveniences for the movements to be 
made. 

111. The artillery unit is sometimes styled a lattery. A 
"battery generally consists of six pieces, although sometimes 
four only are employed. Twelve yards are allowed to the 
iront of each piece. The number of guns in the battery and 
this distance for each gun will determine the length of front 
for a battery. The number of men, generally from twenty 
to thirty for each piece, will determine the total number for 
a company. 

Each piece should have its own caisson, which takes its 
place about fifty yards behind its gun. Irregularities of ground 
may be employed to vary this distance between the caisson 
and gun. 

112. The formation of engineer troops follows the general 
rules laid down for infantry. The men being used in small 
detachments by themselves or detached in charge of other 
troops, the same reasons for their formation, when in the dis- 
charge of their regular duties, do not apply. But as they 
may have to defend themselves, or even to act with others on 
the offensive, they will be for the time acting as infantry ; 
hence the formation of two ranks, and the extent of front 
should be the same for them as for the other troops. 



t**iimt*UiHU*H*M****«M*tni«titn*<«itHmti>i>MtitHt* 



A COURSE OF INSTRUCTION 



THE ELEMENTS 

OF THE 

ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 

FOK THE USE OF THE 

CADETS OF THE 0NJTED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY. 

J BY < 
J. B. WHEELER, 



PROFESSOR OF MILITARY ENGINEERING IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, 
AND BREVET COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY. 



,*' 



NEW YORK: 
D. VAN NOSTRA.ND, PUBLISHER, 

28 MURRAY STREET & 27 WARREN STREET. 

1873. 

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